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Abstract
This study tests the effect of multiple large shareholders on the level of corporate
fraud using the data of Chinese listed companies from 2010 to 2018. We find lower
probabilities and lower corporate fraud frequencies when there are multiple large
shareholders in Chinese listed companies, indicating that their presence plays a
supervisory role in internal governance. These results persist after we control for
endogeneity. Moreover, the effect of multiple large shareholders on corporate fraud
is strengthened with the separation of control right and cash flow right. Further
analyses reveal that companies with multiple large shareholders experience
considerably reduced information disclosure fraud but no reduction in operating or
leader frauds. Additionally, information asymmetry and the capital occupation of
controlling shareholders both play a mediating role in the relationship between
multiple large shareholders and the level of corporate fraud. This study enriches the
literature on the determinants of corporate fraud and the effects of multiple large
shareholders. Our findings also provide implications for companies and regulators
regarding ways to reduce fraud.
Keywords: Multiple large shareholders, Corporate fraud, Separation of control right
and cash flow right, Information asymmetry, Capital occupation
Introduction
Corporate fraud causes a series of destructive economic consequences for companies,
including damage to their reputation, decreased investor confidence, increased finan-
cing costs, and company value reductions (Yu and Yu 2011). Therefore, an analysis
underlying corporate fraud mechanism is of great significance to protecting investors’
interests and promoting healthy development of capital market.
There is a considerable amount of research on multiple large shareholders in the
existing literature. Some literature indicates that large shareholders who are not con-
trolling shareholders have the motivation and ability to participate in corporate affairs
(Shleifer and Vishny 1986, 1997) and influence shareholder decisions. Furthermore,
they can vote or impose “quit threats” on the board of directors (Admati and Pfleiderer
2009; Edmans 2009; Edmans and Manso 2011) and limit controlling shareholders’ self-
interests. These shareholders bring positive results, such as reducing related-party
transactions (Jiang and Kim 2015) and increasing asset liquidity (Bharath et al. 2013).
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Some other studies find that multiple large shareholders are not more efficient than a
single controlling shareholder (Zhu et al. 2018). However, limited research has been
conducted directly on the influence of multiple large shareholders on the level of
corporate fraud.
It is necessary to empirically test whether multiple large shareholders impact the level
of corporate fraud. The monitoring effect of their presence could decrease the fraud
occurring within a company. However, multiple large shareholders may also tunnel a
company, thus reducing the effectiveness of corporate governance and leading to an
increase in corporate fraud. Hence, this issue represents an empirical question to be
tested.
Based on a sample of Chinese listed companies during 2010–2018, we examine the
impact of multiple large shareholders on the level of corporate fraud. The empirical
results show that compared with companies without multiple large shareholders, there
are lower probabilities and lower corporate fraud frequencies in companies with mul-
tiple large shareholders. The association between multiple large shareholders and cor-
porate fraud is more pronounced with higher ownership and control separation.
Further analysis shows that multiple large shareholders could considerably reduce in-
formation disclosure fraud for two major reasons. First, multiple large shareholders can
monitor the self-interest behaviors of controlling shareholders and reduce their capital
occupation, thereby mitigating against information disclosure fraud caused by conceal-
ing behaviors mentioned above. Second, multiple large shareholders can ensure that
monitoring controlling shareholders disclose more information. Additionally, changes
in the number of shares held by multiple large shareholders could also convey informa-
tion to other investors, reducing the degree of information asymmetry. Consistent with
this reasoning, we find that information asymmetry and capital occupation both medi-
ate the relationship between multiple large shareholders and the level of corporate
fraud.
We conduct several robustness tests to confirm the reliability of our results. First, we
use the difference-in-differences (DID) model to alleviate endogeneity problems. Sec-
ond, we use the propensity score matching method. Third, we rerun the regression
using alternative measures of the independent variables. Fourth, we consider other in-
fluencing factors that may affect the results, and the conclusion still holds.
Our study makes several important contributions to the extant literature. First,
the extant research on corporate fraud does not pay enough attention to compan-
ies’ shareholding structure, especially with multiple large shareholders. This article
expands the study of the factors that affect corporate fraud from the perspectives
of multiple large shareholders. Second, this study shows that an ownership arrange-
ment that includes multiple large shareholders can improve the governance of
listed companies in China and reduce the probability and frequency of corporate
fraud. Third, this article explores the types and specific mechanisms underlying the
influence of multiple large shareholders on corporate fraud and contributes to an
understanding of the governance effects of multiple large shareholders. Finally, this
study illustrates the mediating roles of information asymmetry and capital
occupation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant lit-
erature and develops our hypotheses. Section 3 outlines the research design and
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describes the data and sample. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 -
contains robustness tests, and section 6 presents additional tests. Section 7 concludes
this paper.
Literature review and hypothesis development
Economic effects of multiple large shareholders
The extant literature contains different views on the role of multiple large shareholders
in the context of corporate governance.
Multiple large shareholders may exert a positive impact on corporate governance by
reducing agency costs. In emerging market economies such as that of China, conflicts
between large and minority shareholders are much more important than the traditional
principal-agent conflicts between shareholders and managers because of the highly con-
centrated shareholding structure (Li et al. 2004; Luo et al. 2013). Conflicts between
large and minority shareholders are manifested by large shareholders acquiring private
interests at the expense of minority shareholders, called “tunneling” (Johnson et al.
2000). Tunneling includes selling the assets of a company to affiliated companies at low
prices, paying high salaries to managers (controlling shareholders act as managers in
companies that they control), intercorporate loans, and even theft. Capital occupation,
which refers to controlling shareholders illegally occupying companies’ funds, is a more
direct means for controlling shareholders to tunnel listed companies than earnings
management and related-party transactions (Jiang et al. 2010; Ye et al. 2007), because it
is generally considered an unreasonable business practice for listed companies to trans-
fer capital to their controlling shareholders. When a company has multiple large share-
holders, its noncontrolling large shareholders can effectively supervise its controlling
shareholders and reduce their infringement on the interests of minority shareholders
(Boateng and Huang 2017), such as by reducing related-party transactions and capital
occupation (Bloch and Hege 2003). Extant empirical studies provide much evidence for
the supervisory role of multiple large shareholders. For example, they could ease agency
conflicts, reduce corporate debt costs (Wang and Jiang 2017), and reduce financing
constraints (Jiang et al. 2017). Moreover, scholars have also found that companies with
multiple large shareholders have fewer related-party transactions (Chen and Wang
2005), higher dividend payments (Faccio et al. 2001; Wei and Chen 2020), higher-
quality earnings information (Boubaker and Sami 2011), higher-quality internal control
(Ma et al. 2019) and higher company value (Laeven and Levine 2008) than those that
do not. In China, controlling shareholders’ ownership percentages are relatively high;
thus, tunneling is more common, and a reasonably balanced shareholding structure is
needed (Jiang and Kim 2015). Multiple large shareholders may limit the power of con-
trolling shareholders and thus alleviate the abovementioned problems.
However, multiple large shareholders may also reduce the level of corporate govern-
ance and exacerbate agency problems. Prior theoretical foundations have shown that
the presence of multiple large shareholders has an entrenchment effect (Attig et al.
2009; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2000; Luo et al. 2013), which is also known as the
“collusion hypothesis.” The collusion hypothesis is that multiple large shareholders may
collude to obtain private benefits while damaging other stakeholders’ interests. When
the multiple large shareholders of a firm are related parties, these shareholders are
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more inclined to collude to empty the company (Cheng et al. 2015). As Zwiebel
(1995) and Gomes and Novaes (2006) note, multiple large shareholders may con-
spire together to infringe on the interests of others by means of private informa-
tion. Crisóstomo and Brandão (2019) also propose that agreements among a few
large shareholders negatively affect corporate governance. Maury and Pajuste
(2005) further find that when the multiple large shareholders of a firm are all
family-owned companies, they will be more inclined to conspire to tunnel the com-
pany, thereby harming its value. Jara-Bertin et al. (2008) also find that a second
family shareholder in a family firm could reduce the firm’s value. Emerging market
economies implement relatively weak protections for investors. The cost incurred
when large shareholders collude with one another is low (Ma et al. 2019), thus,
the risk that multiple large shareholders will collude still exists.
Among the literature that studies the effects of multiple large shareholders, there is
little research on their impact on the level of corporate fraud. Our paper supplements
the literature from the perspective of fraud.
Determinants of corporate fraud
The internal and external governance characteristics of a company affect corporate
fraud. In internal governance, local independent directors decrease the likelihood and
severity of fraud in listed companies (Zhou and Liu 2017). The largest shareholder in a
company holds multitudes of shares, conducive to restricting illegal behaviors (Chen
et al. 2005). Chen et al. (2006) note that certain characteristics of a company’s board
are related to the frequency of fraud. Particularly, the proportion of outside directors,
the number of board meetings held, and the chairman’s tenure are related to the occur-
ring probability of fraud. Additionally, executive compensation structures are related to
the level of corporate fraud, incentive payments in the form of options increase the
likelihood of fraud, and abnormal upward manipulations of earnings occur during the
execution of fraudulent activities (Peng and Röell 2008). From the perspective of exter-
nal governance, the existing literature finds that a company’s institutional ownership,
media attention, and analyst following all affect its level of corporate fraud. Lu et al.
(2012) find that a company’s institutional ownership level reduces its tendency to vio-
late regulations. Similarly, media attention (Zhou et al. 2016) and analyst following
(Chen et al. 2016) can play a role in external governance and significantly reduce the
frequency of corporate fraud.
The financial characteristics of a company also affect its level of corporate fraud.
Pressures from debt-related issues in avoiding delisting and loss are positively related
to the probability of illegal disclosure behaviors. However, there is no significant rela-
tionship between cash flow pressure and such behaviors (Wu and Ma 2010). The finan-
cial situation is the main cause of fraud among listed companies in China because the
top management teams of firms whitewash performance to ease financial pressures
(Zhang and Jian 2008).
Scholars have studied the determinants and governance mechanisms underlying cor-
porate fraud from many perspectives. However, little research examines the presence of
multiple large shareholders as an internal governance mechanism to test its governance
effect on the level of corporate fraud.
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The effect of multiple large shareholders on the level of corporate fraud
Corporate fraud occurs when insiders (i.e., controlling shareholders, company directors,
or management) of listed companies take opportunistic actions to obtain private bene-
fits (Lei et al. 2020). Previous literature finds that a company’s ownership structure may
influence firms’ various aspects (Wang and Salas 2020). Therefore, we suggest that the
presence of multiple large shareholders will impact the level of corporate fraud.
First, multiple large shareholders may lead to fewer instances of corporate fraud. The
presence of multiple large shareholders can play a direct supervisory role. These share-
holders can induce controlling shareholders to reduce their related-party transactions
and capital occupation (Zhao 2019). In addition, the presence of multiple large share-
holders can play an indirect supervisory role. They can restrict managers and control-
ling shareholders’ self-interest behavior through “quit threats,” thus prompting them to
work hard (Edmans and Manso 2011) and internal information can be given to external
investors through the changes in the shareholding of large shareholders, which may
reduce information asymmetry.
Second, the presence of multiple large shareholders may lead to an increase in cor-
porate fraud. According to the collusion hypothesis, multiple large shareholders may
conspire to harm the interests of minority shareholders and commit fraud jointly. They
may disclose false information to conceal their behavior, thus engaging in information
disclosure fraud. Moreover, multiple large shareholders may reduce the efficiency of
the supervisory effect of controlling shareholders on executives. For example, the in-
consistencies in the interests of the various large shareholders of a company will result
in higher communication costs. Management may use its information advantage to
provide misleading information, thus weakening their supervisory effect (Cheng et al.
2015).
Based on this discussion, we propose two opposing hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: The presence of multiple large shareholders has a negative
correlation with the level of corporate fraud. That is, the presence of multiple large
shareholders decreases the probability and frequency of corporate fraud.
Hypothesis 1b: The presence of multiple large shareholders has a positive
correlation with the level of corporate fraud. That is, the presence of multiple large
shareholders increases the probability and frequency of corporate fraud.
The moderating role of the separation of cash flow right and control right
Multiple large shareholders may influence corporate fraud through information asym-
metry and capital occupation, according to H1a and H1b. We suppose that multiple
large shareholders may play different roles in different degrees of separation between
control and cash flow right. This separation increases the possibility of capital occupa-
tion. Controlling shareholders with different cash flow and control rights have an in-
centive to tunnel companies. This is because the profit they gain from control right is
more than the loss that they bear in proportion to cash flow rights (La Porta et al.
1999; Zhu et al. 2014). However, the separation between control and cash flow rights
increases the possibility of information asymmetry. The controlling shareholder has the
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motivation and ability to falsely disclose the information to cover up the tunneling be-
havior (La Porta et al. 2002). Therefore, if multiple large shareholders can influence the
company’s fraudulent behavior through supervision, their monitoring effect is more ob-
vious for companies with a high degree of separation of cash flow and control rights. If
multiple large shareholders can increase corporate fraud, their collusion effect is more
obvious because it is easier for multiple major shareholders to conspire. Above discus-
sions lead to following hypotheses:
Hypothesis2a: When the separation of controlling shareholder’s control and cash
flow rights is greater, the negative effect of multiple large shareholders on corporate
fraud is more pronounced.
Hypothesis2b: When the separation of controlling shareholder’s control and cash
flow rights is greater, the positive effect of multiple large shareholders on corporate
fraud is more pronounced.
Research design
Sample and data
The sample used in this paper contains all of China’s A-share listed companies from 2010
to 2018. We obtained the financial and fraud data of these companies from the CSMAR
database and manually collected information on persons acting in concert1 and the separ-
ation of cash flow and control rights. We selected this sample based on the following prin-
ciples: First, we dropped 395 observations showing that the largest shareholder has less
than 10% ownership. Then, we dropped 5141 observations because they contained miss-
ing data required to measure firm-specific control variables. Therefore, we were left with
a final sample of 24,704 firm–year observations. This sample selection procedure and the
distribution of the observations by year are presented in panels A and B of Table 1, re-
spectively. The yearly percentage of fraud firms ranges from 7.80% to 22.75% across the
nine years examined and exhibits an inverted U-shaped trend.
Main variable definitions
Dependent variable: corporate fraud (Fraud & Fre)
Following Lu et al. (2012), we use two variables to measure corporate fraud: (1) Fraud
equals 1 if the company was involved with one or more fraud incidents during a year, and 0
otherwise. (2) Fre is the total number of fraud events that the company was involved with
during a year. If the regulatory agencies or the listed company issued a fraud announcement
or relevant media reports, we determine that the listed company had committed fraud. Spe-
cifically, corporate fraud includes information disclosure, operating, and leader frauds.2
1Persons acting in concert: This term refers to alliances among investors, established through agreements
and other arrangements, which jointly expand the number of voting rights of a listed company. The actions
of persons acting in concert are deemed to be the actions of one person under the law, and the number of
their shares must be combined. When the total number of shares held reaches the legal shareholding ratio,
the information disclosure obligation applies.
2According to the regulations of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, information disclosure fraud
includes the following seven subcategories: fictional profits, fictional assets, false records, delayed disclosure,
major information omissions, false disclosures, and improper general accounting treatment. Operating fraud
includes illegal investment, illegal guarantees and other fraudulent activities; leader fraud includes insider
trading, illegal stock trading, and manipulation of stock prices.
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Independent variable: multiple large shareholders (Multi)
La Porta et al. (1999) first propose that shareholders holding 10% of the shares of a
company would have the ability to influence that company’s operating decisions. In
China, shareholders who hold more than 10% of a company’s shares could appoint at
least one of the board’s directors and may even select executives (Jiang et al. 2017; Zhu
et al. 2018). Additionally, the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China provides
that shareholders with an ownership of 10% or more can apply to convene a share-
holders’ meeting. Following the extant literature (Jiang et al. 2015; Laeven and Levine
2008; Maury and Pajuste 2005), we define large shareholders as those who hold more
than 10% of a company’s shares. Furthermore, from the annual reports of listed com-
panies individually, we determine persons acting in concert and combine the number
of shares held by these parties to be counted as one shareholder. Multi equals 1 if the
company has two or more large shareholders in a year, and 0 otherwise.
Moderator: separation of cash flow rights from control rights (Scfc)
The ultimate controlling shareholder with the separation of cash flow and control right
has the motivation to tunnel listed companies as controlling shareholders could benefit
from tunneling listed companies by control rights compared with the proportional
losses matched with cash flow right. Thus, in the environment of information asym-
metry, to cover up the tunnel behavior, the ultimate controlling shareholder has the
motivation and ability to choose the content of information disclosure or even fiction
(Yang and Liu 2018). The CSMAR database identifies a single ultimate controlling
shareholder for each firm and provides a measure of ownership and control. Ownership
carries cash flow right while voting determine control right. For owners that hold
shares directly, ownership and control rights are equal. Indirect holding of shares could
occur through a pyramid and cross-holding schemes that cause these rights to diverge,
divergence compounded by the layering of shareholding relationships. There are many
ownership and control separations, such as the difference between cash flow and con-
trol rights divided by control rights (Yan and He 2018), the difference between the con-
trolling shareholder’s cash flow and control rights (Chen et al. 2018), and so on. We
define Scfc as the difference between cash flow right and control right divided by con-
trol right because it shows the relative difference of separation of cash flow right from
control right.
Table. 1 Sample selection and distribution
Panel A: Sample selection process Observations
Initial firm–year sample from 2010 to 2018 30,240
Observations without large shareholders (395)
Observations with missing values or unmatched values (5141)
Final sample for testing 24,704
Panel B: Distribution by fiscal year
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
# of firm–years 2003 2294 2462 2464 2588 2809 3036 3472 3576
# of fraud firms 322 470 560 525 483 588 480 400 279
% of fraud firms 16.08 20.49 22.75 21.31 18.66 20.93 15.81 11.52 7.80
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Mediator: Information asymmetry (Info)
We use analyst forecasting dispersion to measure information asymmetry because it is
easier for analysts to reach a consensus if information asymmetry is lower. Therefore,
we use the analyst forecast dispersion to reflect the degree of information asymmetry
(Li and Hu 2016).
Mediator: Capital occupation (Occ)
Capital occupation refers to controlling shareholders illegally occupying companies’
funds (Jiang et al. 2010; Ye et al. 2007). Jiang and Yue (2005) find that the capital occu-
pation of controlling shareholders is the main component of other receivables in the
accounting context. Therefore, this study uses Occ (other receivables divided by total
assets) to measure controlling shareholders’ capital occupation.
Empirical models
To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we estimate the following regressions:
Fraudi;t ¼ α0 þ α1Multii;t þ αiControlsi;t þ Fixed E f f ect þ ei;t : ð1 aÞ
Frei;t ¼ β0 þ β1Multii;t þ βiControlsi;t þ Fixed E f f ect þ ei;t : ð1 bÞ
The dependent variables Fraud and Fre are measures of corporate fraud that denote
whether fraud events exist and the number in a year, respectively. We use the Logit
fixed effect model to test the impact of multiple large shareholders on the propensity
for corporate fraud (1-a), and we use the Poisson fixed effect model to test the impact
of multiple large shareholders on the frequency of corporate fraud (1-b). αi and βi rep-
resent the regression coefficients. If the presence of multiple large shareholders re-
strains (increases) corporate fraud, the estimated coefficient of Multi is expected to be
significantly negative (positive) in both models.
We include the following control variables that are considered potential predictors of
corporate fraud. First, we control for the financial characteristics of the companies. We
control firm size (Size) measured as the natural logarithm of total assets. Large com-
panies are more likely to attract the investors’ attention, consequently increasing the
likelihood of fraud being detected (Lu and Li 2016; Wang et al. 2010). Additionally, we
also control for the firm leverage (Lev) because companies facing debt pressure will in-
crease financing costs. To avoid worsening the financing environment, companies
would attempt to avoid disclosing information with excessive debt repayment pressure
or even disclose false information, leading to fraudulent behaviors (Wu and Ma 2010).
Moreover, we control for the firm profitability (Roa) because delisting of listed com-
panies depends on it (Bentley et al. 2013; Wu and Ma 2010). Second, we control the in-
ternal governance characteristics of the companies. We control for Lnboard because
the larger the size of the board of directors, the more likely they tend to be free-riders
and do not criticize the inappropriate practices of the managers, or no longer directly
evaluate their work performance (Cai and Wu 2007; Jensen 1993; Yermack 1996). We
control for Dual because if a company’s CEO concurrently serves as the board’s chair,
the CEO is more likely to appoint his/her board of directors. Therefore, the board of
directors may only access information beneficial to the CEO and cannot perform moni-
toring duties (Boyd 1994; Cai and Wu 2007; Crystal 1991). Finally, external supervisors
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also play a role in restraining corporate fraud (Chen et al. 2016; Deli and Gillan 2000),
and thus we include Ana (denoting the number of financial analysts) and Big10
(whether the audit firms are top 10 or not, according to the ranking table annually pub-
lished by the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants [CICPA]). Additionally,
we control the stock turnover variable Turnover (Lu and Li 2016). The industry and
year effects are also included. For the manufacturing industry, we use two-digit industry
codes.
To test Hypotheses 2a and 2b, we estimate the following models respectively:
Fraudi;t ¼ α0 þ α1Multii;t þ α2Scf ci;t Multii;t þ α3Scf ci;t þ αiControlsi;t
þ Fixed E f f ect þ ei;t : ð2 aÞ
Frei;t ¼ β0 þ β1Multii;t þ β2Scf ci;t Multii;t þ β3Scf ci;t þ βiControlsi;t
þ Fixed E f f ect þ ei;t : ð2 bÞ
In comparison with model (1), we include interaction terms in model (2). Scfc repre-
sents the separation of cash flow right from control right. The higher the degree of sep-
aration of cash flow right from control right, the stronger the motivation of the
controlling shareholder to tunnel. Scfc×Multi is the interaction term of independent
and moderating variables. According to Hypothesis 2a, we expect that the coefficient of
this interaction term would be significantly negative. According to Hypothesis 2b, we
expect that the coefficient of this interaction term would be significantly positive. Other
control variables in model (2) have the same definitions as in model (1). The definitions
for all variables are presented in Table 2.
Main results
Descriptive statistics
Panel A of Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables. All continu-
ous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% to address outliers. The mean of
the dummy variable, Fraud is 0.166, suggesting that 16.6% of the firm-year observations
are also fraudulent. The mean value of Fre is 0.249, while its maximum and minimum
values are 11 and 0, respectively, suggesting that there is a considerable difference be-
tween the numbers of fraud events in different observations. The average value of Multi
is 0.368, indicating that 36.8% of the companies observed have large shareholders. The
statistical results of the control variables are generally consistent with the previous lit-
erature and are not repeated here.
Panel B of Table 3 reports a detailed distribution of the large shareholders. Specific-
ally, observations with a single large shareholder (15,233 observations) accounted for
61.66%, observations with two large shareholders (7249 observations) for 29.34%, and
observations with three or more large shareholders (1849 observations) for 7.48% of the
total sample respectively.
Table 4 shows the Pearson and Spearman correlations among the variables. Fraud
and Fre have a highly positive correlation, indicating that they have a high degree of
consistency. Additionally, Fraud and Fre are negatively correlated with Multi, providing
preliminary support for Hypothesis 1a, such that companies with multiple large share-
holders can reduce corporate fraud. Ana is significantly negatively correlated with
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Fraud and Fre, indicating that analysts can act as external supervisors and reduce the
possibility of corporate fraud; analysts play an effective role in corporate governance.
Similarly, the variable Big10 is negatively correlated with Fraud and Fre, suggesting
that auditors are an important factor in external governance. Additionally, there is no
serious multicollinearity problem, as the absolute values of the correlation coefficients
between all the variables (except that of Fraud and Fre) are mostly below 0.5.
Empirical results: multiple large shareholders and corporate fraud
Table 5 reports the results of models (1-a) and (1-b). Column (1) shows the results of
model (1-a), and column (2) shows the results of model (1-b). These empirical results
show that Multi negatively correlates with Fraud at a significance level of 5%, indicat-
ing that listed companies with multiple large shareholders have a reduced probability of
fraud. Compared to other companies, companies with multiple large shareholders have
Table. 2 Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Panel A: Dependent variable
Fraud Propensity for corporate fraud equals 1 if the company is involved with one or more fraud
incidents in a year, and 0 otherwise.
Fre Frequency of corporate fraud, denoting the total number of fraud events the company is
involved with within a year.
Panel B: Independent variable
Multi A dummy variable. If the company has two or more large shareholders with more than 10%
ownership, the variable equals 1; otherwise, it equals 0.
Panel C: Control variable
Size Firm size equals to the natural logarithm of total assets.
Lev Firm leverage equals to total assets divided by total liabilities.
Roa Return on assets, which equals net profit divided by total assets.
Big10 Audit office. If the auditing company is one of the ten largest audit firms according to the
ranking table of China’s top 100 accounting firms annually published by the CICPA, this
variable equals 1; otherwise, it equals 0.
Ana Number of analysts. This variable equals the natural logarithm of the number of analysts
plus 1.
Lnborad Board size. This variable equals the natural logarithm of the number of directors on a
company’s board.
Dual A dummy variable. If the company’s CEO concurrently serves as the chair of its board, this
variable equals 1; otherwise, it equals 0.
Turnover The average daily total share turnover ratio equals the average value of the daily turnover
rate of the total number of shares during the year.
Scfc Separation of cash flow right from control right equals the difference between cash flow
right and control right divided by control right.
Year_Effect Yearly dummy variable.
Industry_Effect Industrial dummy variable.
Panel D: Mediating variable
Info Information asymmetry is measured by analyst forecasting dispersion. This variable is
calculated as ln(1 + standard deviation of analyst forecast EPS divided by the absolute value
of the actual earnings per share of the companies).
Occ Capital occupation is calculated as other receivables divided by total assets.
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an 11.13% lower probability of fraud.3 Similarly, Multi is negatively correlated with the
number of fraud events (Fre) at a significance level of 5%, meaning fewer fraud events
occur in listed companies with multiple large shareholders. Considering that the esti-
mated coefficient of Multi in column (2) is − 0.0930, companies with multiple large
shareholders experience a 9.30% decrease in the fraud events. Columns (1) and (2) of
Table 5 show that the presence of multiple large shareholders reduces the probability
and frequency of corporate fraud, indicating their monitoring and governance effects,
supporting Hypothesis 1a. The coefficients of control variables are generally consistent
with our expectations and Zou et al. (2019).
Empirical results: the moderating effect of the separation of cash flow right and control
right
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5 present the results of model (2) which examines the
moderating effect of Scfc. Therefore, we are interested in the coefficients of the inter-
action term Scfc×Multi. The coefficients are significantly negative when the dependent
variables are Fraud and Fre (− 0.2795, z = − 1.96;–0.3359, z = − 1.96). Consistent with
our prediction, the results suggest that the inhibitory effect of multiple large share-
holders on corporate fraud is even more pronounced in companies with high separ-
ation of cash flow and control rights, supporting Hypothesis 2a. Additionally, Scfc
significantly increases the probability and frequency of corporate fraud, consistent with
extant literature.
Table. 3 Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Min. Median Max. P25 P75
Panel A: Descriptive statistics of key variables
Fraud 24,704 0.166 0.372 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000
Fre 24,704 0.249 0.691 0.000 0.000 11.000 0.000 0.000
Multi 24,704 0.368 0.482 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Size 24,704 22.088 1.421 19.290 21.879 27.062 21.088 22.826
Lev 24,704 0.436 0.224 0.047 0.423 0.965 0.255 0.602
Roa 24,704 0.037 0.060 −0.258 0.037 0.196 0.014 0.066
Lnboard 24,704 2.142 0.205 1.609 2.197 2.708 1.946 2.197
Big10 24,704 0.566 0.496 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Ana 24,704 1.522 1.157 0.000 1.609 3.738 0.693 2.485
Dual 24,704 0.264 0.441 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000
Turnover 24,704 1.671 1.275 0.124 1.323 6.293 0.727 2.263
Scfc 24,704 0.135 0.206 0.000 0.000 0.790 0.000 0.245
Panel B: Distribution of large shareholders
Number of large shareholders 1 2 3 4 5
Freq. 15,233 7249 1609 213 27
Percent (%) 61.66 29.34 6.51 0.86 0.11
3According to Logit model, we find that ln(Multi/(1-Multi)) = − 0.1180, so odds(Multi = 1)/
odds(Multi = 0) = exp.(− 0.1180) = 0.8887. And we can say that compared to other companies, companies
with multiple large shareholders have an 11.13% (= 0.8887–1) lower probability of fraud.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Zhao et al. Frontiers of Business Research in China            (2021) 15:9 Page 12 of 21
Robustness tests
Difference in differences model
We refer to previous studies (Chen et al. 2001; Lel and Miller 2015) and use the DID
model to estimate the difference in corporate fraud levels before and after the change
in ownership structure. The specific model is as follows:
Fraudi;t ¼ α0 þ α1Af teri;t  Treat1i;tðorTreat2i;tÞ
þ α2Treat1i;tðorTreat2i;tÞ þ αiControlsi;t þ Fixed E f f ect
þ ei;t;: ð3 aÞ
Frei;t ¼ β0 þ β1Af teri;t  Treat1i;tðorTreat2i;tÞ þ β2Treat1i;tðorTreat2i;tÞ
þ βiControlsi;t þ Fixed E f f ect þ ei;t : ð3 bÞ
In these two models, Treat1 (Treat2) is a dummy variable denoting whether the com-
pany’s ownership structure has changed. We code Treat1 as equal to 1 if firms change
from having a structure containing a “single large shareholder” to one composed of
“multiple large shareholders,” and 0 otherwise. We code Treat2 as equal to 1 if a firm’s
structure changes from being composed of “multiple large shareholders” to containing
a “single large shareholder” and 0 otherwise. We delete the observations that Multi
changes two or more times. After is a dummy variable indicating whether the year in
which the observation occurs is after the ownership structure changes. Therefore, the
interaction term composed of After and Treat1 (or Treat2) exhibits the net effect of













Multi −0.1180* (− 1.70) −0.0864* (−1.92) −0.1661** (−2.21) −0.1336*** (− 2.76)
Multi×Scfc −0.2795* (−1.96) − 0.3359* (− 1.81)
Size 0.1819*** (3.43) 0.1649*** (4.91) 0.1631*** (3.31) 0.1688*** (5.42)
Lev −0.2137 (−1.06) − 0.0622 (− 0.49) 0.0198 (0.10) 0.0594 (0.50)
Roa −1.9968*** (−4.49) − 1.4080*** (− 5.41) −1.9804*** (− 4.70) −1.4762*** (− 6.04)
Lnboard 0.3136 (1.44) 0.3691*** (2.66) 0.2943 (1.44) 0.4056*** (3.10)
Big10 −0.1672** (−2.45) − 0.1503*** (−3.45) −0.1384** (− 2.15) −0.1305*** (− 3.17)
Ana − 0.1089*** (− 3.31) −0.1079*** (− 4.99) −0.0917*** (− 2.93) −0.0942*** (− 4.57)
Dual 0.1024 (1.34) 0.0845* (1.76) 0.0678 (0.95) 0.0829* (1.86)
Turnover 0.0617** (2.52) 0.0622*** (4.05) 0.0662*** (2.85) 0.0619*** (4.27)
Scfc 0.2781 (1.25) 0.3114** (2.26) 0.6544*** (2.96) 0.6268*** (4.73)
Individual fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 13,806 13,843 13,806 13,843
L-likelihood − 4590.32 − 7226.44 − 5130.83 − 8090.22
Chi2 378.10 457.62 417.24 521.48
Notes. The model represents by column (1) removed 1923 groups because they contain the same dependent variables
(i.e., all 1 or 0), and 10,898 observations are dropped. The model represented by column (2) deletes 1808 groups because
the dependent variables of these groups are all 0, and 10,754 observations are dropped; this model additionally drops
107 groups (107 observations) because these groups only have one observation per group (similar to the process in the
section below). Xtlogit represents a fixed-effect Logit model. Xtpoisson represents a fixed-effect Poisson model (similar to
the process in the section below). The z-statistics of the estimated parameters are shown in brackets. *, **, **, denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively (the same is true for subsequent tables)
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multiple large shareholders (a single large shareholder) relative to that of a single large
shareholder (multiple large shareholders) on the level of corporate fraud.
The empirical results show that when the company’s equity structure is transformed
from containing a single large shareholder to multiple large shareholders, its tendency
and frequency of corporate fraud are significantly reduced, and companies’ fraudulent
behavior considerably increases after changing from having multiple to a single large
shareholder.4
Alternative measures
As Multi is the key variable, this study uses another definition to ensure the robustness
of the measurement criteria of the presence of multiple large shareholders. Following
Laeven and Levine (2008) and Zhu et al. (2018), we redefine large shareholders to have
over 20% ownership. Therefore, Multi20 (a large shareholder holding more than 20% of
a company’s shares) is used to replace Multi in models (1-a) and (1-b). The empirical
results show that the coefficients of Multi20 are remained essentially unchanged.
Propensity score matching
As listed companies have certain endogenous problems due to their choice of share-
holding structure, we match companies with a single large shareholder to similar com-
panies with multiple large shareholders. We use all the control variables of model (1)
for the matching process and match samples using the nearest matching method at a
ratio of 1:1. Then, we regress these matched samples according to model (1-a) and
model (1-b). The results show that the coefficients of Multi are still significantly
negative.
Considering cross-listed companies
Jiang and Kim (2015) show that cross-listing (i.e., listing a firm on several exchanges
such as the Hong Kong, London, or New York stock exchanges) may mitigate against
the prevalence of corporate fraud in China. First, we control the dummy variable Cross-
list (denoting whether the company is cross-listed or not) in the model; second, we
delete the observations of cross-listed companies. The results show that the above two
methods have not changed the signs or significance of the coefficients of the main vari-
ables. The coefficient of the variable Crosslist is insignificant, meaning whether or not
the company is cross-listed, there is no substantial effect on fraud. A possible reason
for this phenomenon is that the number of cross-listed companies is relatively small.
Considering bank relationships and prior fraud
Jiang and Kim (2015) argue that punishment is an element of the legal environment
that may affect the level of corporate fraud. They also propose that banks may play a
monitoring role. However, Chinese studites pay little attention to these concepts.
We take the variable Bankloan to control for the banking relationships. To measure
bank financing, following Qian and Yeung (2015), we use the total outstanding loans
(adjusted by their total assets) based on their balance sheets. The results show that
there is a positive correlation between Bankloan and Fraud, consistent with the
4Result tables are not reported for brevity, but are available upon request.
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findings of Qian and Yeung (2015); that is, the lenders themselves (i.e., banks) do not
play a monitoring role in China, and banks lend to firms even when these firms’ con-
trolling shareholders tunnel at the expense of the firm’s minority shareholders.
To control for prior fraud and fines, we take the variable Prepunish denoting whether
the company has been punished for fraud by a regulator in the past year or not. The re-
sults show that if companies have been punished by a regulator, their probability and
frequency of fraud are significantly increased. A possible reason for this phenomenon is
that the punishments inflicted on listed companies by regulators are relatively light, but
prior instances of punishment increase the public’s attention on a company. Therefore
subsequent fraud is more likely to be discovered.
Further analyses
Number of large shareholders and corporate fraud
Gomes and Novaes (2006) consider that multiple large shareholders have different in-
terests. Even if other large shareholders do not subjectively protect the interests of mi-
nority shareholders, the competition between large shareholders for control right will
also objectively prevent behaviors that harm the interests of the minority. Boubaker
and Sami (2011) find that the fiercer the competition for control right between multiple
large shareholders, the more significant the supervisory effect among large shareholders
will be. We use the number of shareholders with over 10% ownership, excluding the
controlling shareholder, to measure the number of non-controlling large shareholders
(Largenum). Models (1-a) and (1-b) are used for regression, and the results show that
the number of large shareholders is negatively related with corporate fraud.
Multiple large shareholders and different types of fraud
Referring to the classification of company fraud types by the China Securities Regula-
tory Commission, this article classifies corporate fraud into the following groups: infor-
mation disclosure fraud, operating fraud, and leader fraud. This article examines the
effect of multiple large shareholders on different types of fraud to comprehensively
analyze the effects of the presence of multiple large shareholders. Among these types,
information disclosure fraud accounts for 72.07% of the total fraud in China. Operating
fraud accounts for 62.14%; leader fraud accounts for 22.69%; the sum of these percent-
ages exceeds 100% because one fraud event may belong to more than one of these
groups. The impact of the presence of multiple large shareholders on the different types
of fraud is shown in Table 6.
Table 6 shows that the governance effect of multiple large shareholders on operating
and leader frauds is not significant; however, it is significant in the case of information
disclosure fraud. The possible reasons are as follows. There are differences in the pun-
ishments inflicted by the regulatory authorities in cases involving these three types of
fraud, considering the securities market system. Chinese regulatory authorities punish
operating and leader frauds more seriously than they do information disclosure fraud.
Serious operating and leader frauds may even violate criminal law. However, Chinese
regulators impose relatively light penalties for information disclosure fraud. In most
cases, companies engaging in this type of fraud are punished only by warnings, repri-
mands, and rectification orders. This punishment is very disproportionate to the
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considerable gains that can be obtained from such fraud. This low cost makes informa-
tion disclosure fraud the most common among listed companies. Therefore, the super-
visory role of multiple large shareholders is more obvious in information disclosure
fraud since its penalty is relatively light. The impact of multiple large shareholders on
the fraud of listed companies is complementary to legal punishments.
Mechanism test 1: information asymmetry
The previous analysis regarding the impact of multiple large shareholders on the level
of corporate fraud reveals that this equity structure is a good corporate governance
mechanism and that it plays a supervisory role. A controlling shareholder can obtain
internal information regarding the enterprise that is unknown to external investors,
and therefore, information asymmetry between the controlling shareholder and the ex-
ternal investors exist. When there are multiple large shareholders in a company, Ander-
son et al. (2003) note that the degree of information asymmetry within the company is
increased by the restrictions imposed by the controlling shareholders on information
disclosure, and multiple large shareholders can alleviate this problem by directly moni-
toring the controlling shareholders. However, the change in the shareholding percent-
ages of large shareholders can increase the amount of information given to external
investors. Chen et al. (2020) find that transmitting firm-specific information can de-
crease information asymmetry and stock price synchronicity. Therefore, the presence
of multiple large shareholders may inhibit corporate fraud by reducing a company’s de-
gree of information asymmetry.
According to Kovacs (2010), this article selects analyst forecasting dispersion to
measure information asymmetry (Info). Following Li and Hu (2016), we use the follow-
ing formula to calculate analyst forecast dispersion:




In model (4), AEPSi,t denotes the actual earnings per share of the companies ob-
served; STD (FEPS) i,t is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of earnings per
share.
Referring to the methods of Wen and Ye (2014), the following mediation effect re-
gression model is established:
Table 6 Multiple large shareholders and different types of fraud
Information disclosure fraud Operating fraud Leader fraud













Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Individual
fixed effect
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 10,265 10,302 9222 9259 5574 5574
L-likelihood − 3339.49 − 5627.14 − 2967.60 − 5001.61 − 1420.27 − 2206.27
Chi2 339.71 443.08 341.74 393.39 169.82 246.88
Notes: *, **, **, respectively, denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels
Zhao et al. Frontiers of Business Research in China            (2021) 15:9 Page 16 of 21
Inf oi;t ¼ α0 þ α1Multii;t þ αiControlsi;t þ Fixed E f f ect þ ei;t : ð5 aÞ
Fraud=Frei;t ¼ α0 þ α1Multii;t þ α2Inf oi;t þ αiControlsi;t þ Fixed E f f ect
þ ei;t : ð5 bÞ
In the context of a mediation regression test, if α1 in the model (5-a) is significantly
nonzero, this indicates that the presence of multiple large shareholders has a significant
impact on information asymmetry; otherwise, the regression will be stopped. In the
model (5-b), if α1 and α2 are not 0, this can preliminarily verify information asymme-
trys’ mediation effect. Table 7 reports the mechanism test results, which show that
Multi is significantly negatively correlated with Info. After controlling the Info variable
in the main regression, we find that Info significantly increases the corporate fraud
probability and frequency. The coefficient of Multi is still significant in columns (2)
and (3). Therefore, information asymmetry partially mediates the relationship between
multiple large shareholders and the level of corporate fraud.
Mechanism test 2: capital occupation
The mutual supervision among several large shareholders makes it impossible for any
shareholder to control the operational decisions of the enterprise alone. Additionally,
these large shareholders can supervise the controlling shareholder to reduce self-
interest behavior (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon 2000; Bloch and Hege 2003; Pagano and
Röell 1998), protect the interests of small and medium investors. A controlling share-
holder’s entrenchment behavior is mainly manifested through capital occupation.
Therefore, we propose that the presence of multiple large shareholders reduces corpor-
ate fraud by reducing the level of controlling shareholders’ capital occupation. This
Table. 7 Mechanism test: Information asymmetry and capital occupation

































Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19,065 9379 9514 24,453 13,646 13,695
L-likelihood − 3010.61 − 4477.43 − 4552.45 − 7154.79
Chi2 274.33 323.40 380.13 454.43
R2 0.319 0.026
F value 374.73 28.68
Notes. The model represented by column (2) delete 1897 groups due to these groups having the same dependent
variables (i.e., all 1 or 0), and 9686 observations were dropped. The model represented by column (3) deleted 1689
groups because the dependent variables of these groups are all 0, and 9382 observations were dropped; additionally,
this model deleted 169 groups (169 observations) because these groups only had one observation per group. Similarly,
the model represented by column (5) deleted 1912 groups because these groups have the same dependent variables
(i.e., all 1 or 0), and 10,807 observations were dropped; the model represented by column (6) deleted 1797 groups
because the dependent variables of these groups were all 0, and 10,656 observations were dropped; additionally, this
model deleted 102 groups (102 observations) because these groups only had one observation per group
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study measures capital occupation as the agency cost incurred when controlling share-
holders infringe on the interests of minority shareholders.
Similar to the previous procedures, the following mediation effect regression model is
established:
Occi;t ¼ α0 þ α1Multii;t þ αiControlsi;t þ Fixed E f f ect þ ei;t : ð6 aÞ
Fraud=Frei;t ¼ α0 þ α1Multii;t þ α2Occupationi;t þ αiControlsi;t
þ Fixed E f f ect þ ei;t : ð6 bÞ
In model (6-a), if α1 is significantly nonzero, this indicates that multiple large share-
holders have a significant impact on embezzlement by controlling a company’s share-
holders; otherwise, the regression will be stopped. In model (6-b), if α1 and α2 are not
0, this can preliminarily verify the mediation effect of capital occupation. Columns (4)
and (5) of Table 7 report the results of mechanism test 2, showing that the presence of
multiple large shareholders is significantly negative regarding capital occupation. After
controlling for occupation in models (1-a) and (1-b), we find that Multi is still signifi-
cantly negative and Occ is positive as shown in columns (5) and (6) of Table 7, consist-
ent with the assumption that the capital occupation of controlling shareholders may be
positively related to the level of corporate fraud. Therefore, the presence of multiple
large shareholders reduces corporate fraud by reducing the capital occupation of con-
trolling shareholders.
Conclusion
In recent years, corporate fraud has become a hot topic among scholars, and the prior
literature has studied various determinants. However, there is little evidence on how
multiple large shareholders influence corporate fraud.
This study examines the impact of multiple large shareholders on corporate fraud.
We show that the presence of multiple large shareholders results in improved corpor-
ate governance using a sample of Chinese listed companies during 2010–2018. There
are lower probabilities and frequencies of corporate fraud when companies have mul-
tiple large shareholders. Furthermore, the negative effects of multiple large shareholders
on corporate fraud are pronounced with the separation of ownership and control. Add-
itionally, information asymmetry and capital occupation play mediating roles in this re-
lationship. Based on additional tests, the more multiple large shareholders, the less the
tendency and frequency of corporate fraud. The governance effect of multiple large
shareholders on operating and leader frauds is not significant. However, in the case of
information disclosure fraud, it is significant. Our results remain after several robust-
ness tests.
Our study enriches the literature on corporate fraud and multiple large shareholders.
Moreover, our results reveal two specific mechanisms by which multiple large share-
holders influence corporate fraud, that is, increasing information transparency and re-
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